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Is Language the Ultimate Artefact? (henceforth ILUA) was originally published 
alongside a paper by Andy Clark called Is Language Special? Some remarks on control, 
coding, and co-ordination (Clark 2004). One concern (among others) of the latt r paper 
was to resist the argument of the former. In this sort afterword, I shall attempt a counter-
response to Clark’s resistance. In so doing I hope t  r veal, in a new and perhaps clearer 
way, what the most important issues really are in this (still unresolved) debate.   
Let’s begin by recalling the pivotal disagreement at he heart of the matter, as 
identified in the original exchange. Clark’s position-defining claim is that language is “an 
external resource that complements but does not profoundly alter the brain’s own basic 
modes of representation and computation” (Clark 1997, p.198). The issue concerns the 
representational rather than the computational half of this continuity. The disputed point, 
reiterated by Clark in his response to me, is that “[the] brain represents [linguistic] 
structures, of course. But it does so in the same way it represents anything else. They do 
not re-organize neural routines in any way that is deeper or more profound than might 
occur, say, when we first learn to swim, or to play volleyball.” (Clark 2004, p.720) Now I 
agree that this claim holds in the case of on-line anguage use, that is, in the case of 
language-involving behaviour in which the relevant material symbols (such as printed 
text or ambient linguistic sounds) are present in the currently accessible environment and 
may thus form proper parts of a real-time distributed cognitive process.1 However, I 
argue that it fails in the case of off-line language use such as linguistic inner rehearsal, in 
which the relevant material symbols are, by hypothesis, not present in the currently 
accessible environment. Here (again) is why. 
Given a distributed approach to cognition (which is ground shared by Clark and 
me), how one understands the transition between on-line and off-line language use must 
be shaped by the general (i.e., non-language-specific) point that, in paradigmatic cases of 
distributed cognition, adaptive success ensues becaus , during the actual run-time of the 
behaviour, certain internal elements become directly causally locked onto the 
contributing external elements. When our reasoning is off-line, there are, by hypothesis, 
                                                
1 The term ‘material symbols’ is due to Clark.  
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no such environmental factors onto which the mechanisms concerned could be locked. 
Nevertheless, the claim that fundamentally the same kind of computational processes are 
in play might survive, just so long as there exist certain inner surrogates for those missing 
environmental factors, surrogates which recapitulate certain structural properties of those 
factors, viz. the ones, whatever they may be, to which the mechanisms concerned are 
designed so as to be mechanically keyed. So, in the linguistic case, what we need are 
inner surrogates that realize the critical structural p operties of the very linguistic material 
symbols that support the corresponding on-line langu ge-involving behaviour. Since the 
critical structural properties will be linguistic ones, the inner surrogates must themselves 
be linguistically structured (or so I suggested in ILUA). So Clark’s claim that linguistic 
structures “do not re-organize neural routines in any way that is deeper or more profound 
than might occur, say, when we first learn to swim, or to play volleyball” is violated. A 
sub-set of language-related cognition requires a transformation in the brain’s own basic 
mode of representation, from one that is essentially non-linguistic in form to one that is 
essentially linguistic. Here’s how Clark describes thi  alleged predicament. (‘My’ and ‘I’ 
in the following quotation refer to Clark.):   
 
[On the one hand, my position] means rejecting the idea that language 
processing requires some very special kind of internal processing and 
representation. On the other hand, I want to unpack offline cogitation, quite 
generally, in terms of internal recapitulations of the relevant-but-missing 
environmental structures. Since the environmental structures, in the 
linguistic case, are quite patently (perhaps tautolog usly) structured in a 
linguaform way, did not I just lose the farm, at least as far as the internal 
representations are concerned? Perhaps, Wheeler concedes, the processing 
can be unaffected… But the internal representations really have been 
radically re-structured by the need for the offline use of linguistic resources. 
(Clark, 2004, p.721) 
 
Clark attempts to escape from this potential quandary by suggesting that my argument 
actually falls short of its intended mark. 
 
All [Wheeler’s] argument shows is that the inner surogates must amount to 
a representation, useable off-line, of the relevant environmental structures. 
But a representation of structure is not thereby… a structured representation. 
Just as I can represent greenness without deploying a green inner vehicle, so 
too I can represent a sentence as involving three component ideas (John, 
loving, and Mary, to stick with the tired old example) without thereby 
deploying an inner vehicle that itself comprises three distinct symbols 
exhibiting that articulation. (Clark 2004, p.722)  
 
Now, Clark is surely right to point out that a reprsentation of some X-with-a-certain-
structure is not hereby an X-structured representation. So he is indeed corre t that one 
can represent a structured sentence without thereby deploying an inner vehicle that itself 
comprises all the very same elements and structure as that public sentence. My original 
argument moved too quickly for its own good. But establishing that some inner surrogate 
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need not recapitulate all the very same elements and structure as are realized by its 
representational target does not establish that that surrogate need not recapitulate certain 
structural properties of that target. And although it may well be obvious that representing 
greenness does not necessitate the presence of a green inner vehicle, it is rather less 
obvious that representing a missing structured syntactic object, in a way that secures 
competence in the relevant cognitive domain, does not necessitate some degree of 
significant structural recapitulation on the part of the inner element, and that’s all my 
argument needs. So the unresolved question is how much structure is needed, and what 
the character of that structure is, in particular cases.  
What Clark owes us, I believe, is a developed account f how linguistic inner 
rehearsal may take place without the kind of significant recapitulation of linguistic 
structure that, I suggest, is lurking in the explanatory wings. Fortunately, a  sketch of how 
such an account might go is on offer. Clark calls it the cognitive self-stimulation model of 
off-line language use (Clark unpublished). So let’s see how it fares. As I understand it, 
the core of Clark’s view is that, in off-line language-use, human beings do their thinking 
using inner images of words. The notion of an ‘image’ should be understood in a wide 
sense here, so as to include structures with an auditory or multi-modal character, as well 
as those of a purely visual kind. Thus, according to Clark, in on-line language use we 
access certain environmental inputs (e.g. the word on the page, the sentence in the air) 
that stimulate the brain, via sensation, so as to perturb it into different regions of its state 
space. This account of on-line language use is design d to cohere with the general 
distributed cognition approach to on-line intelligenc . Subsequently, in off-line language 
use, we ‘simply’ self-create surrogates for the now-missing inputs, sometimes in the form 
of potentially observable structures such as audible vocalizations, but often in the form of 
inner images of the sort just mentioned. Given that t ese self-created surrogates are 
designed to preserve only the relevant sensory properties (the shapes that one sees, the 
sounds that one hears), they do not realize linguistic tructure. Moreover, it is 
unmysterious how they might invoke essentially the same inner processes as are invoked 
by the environmental inputs in the on-line case. Thus continuity of representational 
structure and of computational process is preserved.   
So why should there be cause to worry about this undeniably attractive story? The 
first thing to note is that Clark’s flagship example of off-line mathematical reasoning 
(which, as I argue in ILUA, is analogous to the linguistic case) tends to skew one’s 
receptivity to the self-stimulation model. Clark focuses on the example of using imagined 
Venn diagrams in our heads, and notes that “there is no reason to suppose that… [this 
requires]… the installation of a different kind of computational device”, different, that is, 
to the one active during cases of on-line reasoning involving Venn diagrams on the page 
(Clark, 1997, p.199). A cognitive self-stimulation account would seem to have some 
cogency here. One simply self-creates images of the missing diagrams and deploys the 
same processing strategies. However, because of thefundamentally spatial, and therefore 
essentially visual, nature of the reasoning, the Venn diagram example rewards the idea of 
self-created pseudo-sensory inputs, but is potentially misleading as to the general 
prospects for the cognitive self-stimulation model, and thus for the kind of continuity that 
Clark advocates. To see this, consider another, and arguably more central, example of 
off-line mathematical reasoning, namely performing i  one’s head the kind of calculation 
that, in the on-line case, might standardly be tackled using pen and paper and the 
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machinery of long multiplication, but which under pressure we can perform off-line. Do 
we really imagine the carryings of numbers that figure as on-the-page manipulations in 
the on-line case? That’s the sort of thing that would seem to be required for cognitive 
self-stimulation to get any purchase. Phenomenological intuitions may vary, of course, 
but I’m willing to bet that, for most people, imagined carryings are just not part of our 
experience here. If this is right, then there is some evidence already to suggest that the 
door is far from closed on the sort of transformation n representational structure that I 
have argued is present in the transition from on-line cases of language-involving 
cognition to their off-line cousins. 
So let’s now open that door as wide as we can, by reflecting on Clark’s own 
chosen example of an extant cognitive-scientific approach that demonstrates his key 
point, viz. that a representation of some X-with-a-certain-structure is not thereby an X-
structured representation. That example is Elman’s dynamical connectionist modelling of 
language (Elman 1995). The relevant studies here featur  what has come to be known as 
an Elman net, a simple recurrent connectionist network in which the widely used three-
layer architecture of input, hidden, and output units is extended to include a group of 
context units. These units store the activation-values of the hidden units at any one time-
step, and then feed that information back to the hidden units at the following time-step. 
The present state of such a network is thus a function of both the present input and the 
network’s previous state, which, as Elman shows, allows this sort of system to encode 
sequential information, and thus to succeed at certain prediction-tasks. For example, 
given a corpus of simple sentences, constructed from a small set of nouns and verbs, and 
presented so that the only information explicitly available to the network was 
distributional information concerning statistical regularities of occurrences in the input 
strings, Elman was able to train a simple recurrent network to predict the cohort of 
potential word successors under various conditions of use. (A cohort is made up of all the 
words consistent with a given span of input.)  
Subsequent statistical analysis of the network demonstrated that it had achieved 
its predictive capabilities by inducing several categories of words which were implicit in 
the distributional regularities in the input data.  These induced categories had an 
implicitly hierarchical structure. Nouns were split into animates and inanimates, sub-
categories which themselves were subdivided (into, for example, classes such as humans, 
nonhumans, breakables, and edibles). Verbs were grouped in the following categories: (a) 
requiring a direct object, (b) optionally taking a direct object, and (c) being intransitive. 
Conceptually similar words drive the network into regions of activation space that are 
close together, so conceptual similarity is captured via position in activation space. The 
most general linguistic categories, such as ‘noun’ and ‘verb’, correspond to large areas of 
this space, whilst more specific categories and (ultimately) individual words correspond 
to progressively smaller sub-regions of larger areas. Thus the space implicitly realizes the 
hierarchical structure described above.  
According to Clark, this Elman net is a language-navig ting system that 
represents linguistic structure while failing to realize linguistically structured 
representations. However, as far as I can see, this judgment can’t be right. In my view the 
statistically visible states realized by this network do qualify as inner elements with 
linguistic structure. Of course, given the nature of the emergent groupings in question 
(see above), the states at issue do not perhaps obey the traditional syntax-semantics 
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distinction, but that, in and of itself, doesn’t stop those states from being linguistic in 
character. Its activation space is structured in terms of nouns, verbs, transitivity, 
intransitivity, and so on.  How much more linguistic does it get?  
At this point someone might be tempted to point out that, as with any 
connectionist network of this kind, there’s a representational-computational level of 
description at which we don’t see linguistically structured states, but rather weight 
matrices and patterns of activation values. However, that observation alone can’t carry 
the day. As should be clear from my description of Elman’s study, the statistically visible 
states here do genuine explanatory work Under these circumstances I think we should 
unhesitatingly proceed to reify those states. And if that’s correct, then what we have here 
is a system that realizes linguistic structure, andnot a language-navigating system that 
represents linguistic structure while failing to realize linguistically structured 
representations. 
One further objection that Clark might be tempted to make here is suggested by 
something else that he says in Is Language Special?. He notes there that my position 
depends on the assumption that it is theoretically possible to separate the structure of the 
representation from the nature of the associated processing, in such a way that it would be 
possible to speak of a fundamental transformation in the mode of representation but not 
in the associated mode of computation. I agree that the argument of ILUA depends on 
this assumption. Indeed, I’m up front about it (see ILUA footnote 18). But, according to 
Clark, this assumption is ultimately misguided, since “for a representation to genuinely 
be structured in a certain way, just IS for the system to be able to operate upon it in 
certain ways” (Clark, 2004, p.722, footnote 3). But now if representation and 
computation are intimately co-defined, one might refus  to reify the higher-order states of 
the Elman net on the grounds that since all the computational processing plausibly goes 
on at the level of the connection weights and unit activations, the higher-order states in 
question cannot be the objects of computational processes, and so cannot be 
representational in character, and so cannot figure in the fundamental representational-
computational story. Of course, I’m inclined to reject the claim of intimate co-definition, 
but rather than argue for that here, I’d like to draw out a consequence of using that claim 
to resist the reification move. If the proposed alternative condition for reification (being 
the object of a computational process) were to be applied generally, and if we assume for 
the moment that connectionism provides a good model f the fundamental character of 
mind (as Clark does), then the only level at which one could speak of representations at 
all is at the level of weights and activation values. The present proposal would thereby 
mandate the elimination from our cognitive ontology of all sorts of higher-order 
psychological structures that are not reflected directly in the lower-level processing story. 
Writing blank cheques to eliminativism is not something that I think Clark would want to 
encourage. So this objection fails too.  
To repeat by way of conclusion: The test-case Elman net is not a language-
navigating system that represents linguistic structure while failing to realize linguistically 
structured representations. Rather, it is a system hat navigates language by itself 
realizing linguistic structure. Thus it does not provide the kind of evidence that Clark 
needs in order to resist the argument of ILUA. In my view that argument is still well 
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